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1 Introduction 
The emergence of entrepreneurial firms initiates a broad range of positive effects in 
economic development (Drucker, 1985; Schumpeter, 1934; Teece, 1986). Research 
indicates however, that the probability of survival is rather limited for new organisations 
(Freeman et al., 1983). Stinchcombe (1965) labelled this phenomenon the ‘liability of 
newness’, and argued that new organisations’ general resource poverty, lack of 
legitimacy, and weak ties to external actors provide them with reduced capacity when 
competing with established players.  
Though environmental influence on organisation survival is well documented 
(Aldrich, 1979; Cooper, 1993; Freeman et al., 1983; Gartner et al., 1998; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977; Sandberg and Hofer, 1987), recent studies have shown that successful 
management of internal resources can significantly improve venture performance and the 
likelihood of survival (Boeker, 1989; Hambrick et al., 1996; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; 
Shephard et al., 2000; Smith et al., 1994). This is especially true for new organisations in 
emerging, fast-moving industries (Birley and Stockley, 2000; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Virany and Tushman, 1986). Initial resource management decisions, in particular, 
appear to be of special significance, as these decisions stick with the organisation in the 
long run (Boeker, 1988, 1989; Gersick, 1991; McDougall et al., 1994).  
Due to the general resource poverty of entrepreneurial ventures, the new venture 
teams face considerable challenges in gaining access to financial resources as well as 
other resources like business knowledge, experience, and networks. Because of the 
venture capital funds’ hands on approach to their investments, attracting financing from 
such equity providers is generally perceived as a viable approach for these ventures in 
order to fill their resource gap. A unique characteristic of Venture Capitalists (VCs) is 
that they to a large extent they prefer to be hands-on investors, offering knowledge 
resources in addition to the financial capital offered (Brush et al., 2001). Therefore,  
VCs may represent a source for complementary skills that augment the resource base of a 
venture capital backed venture.  
Venture capital research has basically followed two distinct paths to link the post 
investment behaviour of VCs to performance of their portfolio companies. The most 
dominant path is that of VCs’ employment of governance mechanisms to control the new 
venture teams of their portfolio companies. This research has to a great extent been 
rooted in agency theory, contending that contracting and monitoring efforts can improve 
portfolio firm performance by reducing agency costs. The second path is rooted in 
resource based logic. In this part of venture capital research, scholars study the 
relationship between the venture capitalist as a provider of non-financial resources  
(e.g., obtaining alternative sources of equity financing, serving as a sounding board to the 
new venture team, and formulating business strategy) and portfolio firm performance. 
Focus within this research is on both human capital (the venture capitalist’s experience 
and expertise) and social capital (the VCs access to resources from other 
firms/organisations due to their network). 
In this paper, we address the question of linking post-investment behaviour of  
hands-on equity providers as VCs to portfolio firm performance by discussing a new 
challenge for both entrepreneurs and their equity providers. Hence, we argue that a 
general shift in business logic represents a need for both entrepreneurs and hands-on 
investors to rethink their current way of structuring their cooperation. First, we describe 
the shift in business logic in general and its consequences for the resource acquisition 
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process for new venture teams. Second, we discuss different definitions on 
entrepreneurship and the effects of the new way of thinking business. Third, we use the 
resource-based theory of the firm as a point of departure for describing the resource 
acquisition process of entrepreneurial venture and to highlight the importance of early 
decisions for such ventures. Finally, rooted in agency theory, we discuss the role of VCs 
regarding their monitoring and control effort to reduce agency risk. We conclude the 
paper with suggestions for both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs to adapt to the new 
way of thinking business.  
2 Paradigm shift: from industry to information society 
There has been a paradigm shift from an industrial society to an information society that 
emerged in the 1990s (Wananabe and Nagamatsu, 2003). This shift in paradigm has 
included a shift in the logic of business. The business logic governs the way 
entrepreneurs and investors think business. In the old paradigm, the industry society, 
there were firm and stable sequences between producers of raw materials and retailers 
further up in the value chain, and focus was on economic inputs and returns.  
The customer’s role was passive receivers of goods and services. In the new paradigm, 
the information society, the logic of business has changed. The value chain has been 
replaced by a value creating star (Normann, 2001).  
“Instead of seeing the business as a flow of materials to which value is 
continuously added and ending with the customer, we now see business starting 
from the customers and flowing to the company. The perspective changes from 
inside out to outside in.” (Normann, 2001, p.21) 
The critical competence for the company has changed from knowledge about production 
to knowledge about the customer. The business company changes from being a producer 
to being an organiser of value creation (Normann, 2001).  
The foundation for the shift in paradigm from old to new business logic is based on 
the new information technology with four main characteristics linked to the computer: 
Procedural (logic engines), participatory (encourage a sense of participation), spatial 
(create virtual space), encyclopaedic (store huge amounts of information easily)  
(Hanson, 2000, pp.39–45). We add reduced transaction costs (Williamson, 1975) as a 
consequence of the technology shift. This shift in the business paradigm creates new 
problems and new options for the entrepreneur. Especially, the development of the 
business concept (Bhave, 1994) becomes of vital importance.  
3 Entrepreneurship and stage-of development models 
Despite the multitude of entrepreneurship definitions existing in the literature, it does not 
seem controversial to include ‘new offer’ within the concept of entrepreneurship. 
According to Cooper (1993), a new offer could either be a new product/service, a new 
price/value relation, or a new bundle of product and service components. The first 
category, new product or service, corresponds to Schumpeter (1934) ‘new product’ and 
deals with the case when a product/service is so new that when it is introduced that a new 
market is created. The second category, new price/value relations is related to the 
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production possibility curve (Landström, 1999) and a more effective combination of 
resources. The third category, ‘new bundle’, is distinct from the first two in several ways. 
Davidsson describes this category as  
“any combination of product and service components that – as a package  
deal – is unique relative to what has previously been offered on the market, 
although no individual component may be strictly new.” (Davidsson, 2004, p.9) 
This kind of entrepreneurship does not necessarily take place at the product/production 
level. Rather, it may be addressed as developments regarding ‘business concept’  
(Bhave, 1994) or ‘business model’ (Amit and Zott, 2001). This is very much in line with 
what (Normann, 2001) refers to as being an organiser of value creation rather than a 
producer. Amit and Zott highlights this kind of entrepreneurship as especially relevant to 
e-business:  
“Value creation opportunities in virtual markets may result from new 
combinations of information, physical products and services, innovative 
configurations of transactions, and the reconfiguration and integration of 
resources, capabilities, roles and relationships among suppliers, partners and 
customers.” (Amit and Zott, 2001, p.496) 
New product/service and new price/value relationship in many ways reflect a traditional 
view of entrepreneurship with regard to the introduction of a new product/service or 
production technology. Due to the product/production orientation represented by  
these categories, the act of entrepreneurship is often regarded as a sequential process 
(e.g., Bhave, 1994; Kazanjian, 1988; Kazanjian and Drazin, 1990; Webster, 1976, 1977). 
Hence, independent entrepreneurial start-ups are often analysed within the framework of 
stage-of development models or life cycle approaches (e.g., Kazanjian, 1988; Kazanjian 
and Drazin, 1990; Webster, 1976, 1977). Kazanjian and Drazin (1990) proposed and 
tested a stage of growth model consisting of four stages; conception and development, 
commercialisation, growth, and stability. This model is representative for the stage-of 
development models found in the literature on entrepreneurship and similar stage models 
are often found in different textbooks within entrepreneurship. Stage-of development 
models, or life cycle approaches, are also commonly employed within the literature on 
entrepreneurial finance. Here, different financial sources and finance providers are linked 
to different phases of the venture to be financed (e.g., Mason and Harrison, 1999; 
Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000; Sahlman, 1990). In this setting, the detailing level is 
adjusted to the purpose of the analysis; i.e., finding the appropriate required rate of return 
for investments in different stages (e.g., Wetzel, 1981). The stage-of development logic is 
further utilised by venture capital setting regarding how VCs set up contracts and govern 
their firms post investment. According to Sahlman (1990, p.506): “The most important 
mechanism for controlling the venture is staging the infusion of capital”. This means that 
the investors provide the portfolio company only with capital expected to be sufficient to 
take the company to the next stage of development. This serves both as an incentive to 
the entrepreneurial not to misuse capital, as well as reducing risk for the investor.  
Entrepreneurial endeavour falling within the category of ‘new bundle’, however,  
do not fit very well into the stage-of development models found in the entrepreneurship 
literature. As opposed to the traditional product/service driven entrepreneurial ventures,  
a distinction between a product development stage and a commercialisation stage  
may not mirror the actual process. This may complicate both the conceptualisation  
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of such firms, in addition to put demands for the governance effort by the investors 
investing in such firms.  
4 Venture Capitalists (VCs) as resource providers 
In recent years, several scholars have made a case for the appropriateness of the 
Resource-Based View (RBV) in understanding entrepreneurial processes (Dollinger, 
1999; Rotefoss, 2001) and new firm strategic behaviour (Busenitz et al., 2004). 
According to RBV scholars, the firm can be conceptualised as a bundle of resources and 
capabilities (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991, 1995, 2001; Conner, 1991; 
Mahoney and Pandian, 1992). Venkataraman and Ven de Ven (1998) argue that the most 
crucial activity in the business development process revolves around the identification, 
assembly, and allocation of resources. Initially, an emergent venture will neither possess 
nor control the resources necessary for survival and growth. Still, entrepreneurs are 
forced to react to the rapid change of their environment, which requires recourses and 
expertise far beyond what is controlled by the new venture at inception. Hence, the  
new venture team’s most challenging task is the acquisition of adequate resources. 
According to this perspective, the entrepreneurial process is one in which the 
entrepreneurs acquire and develop resources, and where the new venture outcome is to a 
large extent determined by the nature of the resources the entrepreneurs are able to 
acquire (Dollinger, 1999). 
An important aspect of the hands-on approach adopted by the venture capital 
providers is that they, themselves, represent a portfolio of complementary skills that  
can augment the resource base of the new venture. In general, VCs specialise in  
network activities and monitoring, whereas the entrepreneurial teams acquire  
particular knowledge regarding opportunity exploitation and the operation of the venture 
(Cable and Shane, 1997). In general, VCs have experience from prior investments in 
other ventures. Due to learning-curve effects (Brittain, 1989) and network-building 
effects, this experience may increase the probability of survival and growth for  
the portfolio companies of venture capital firms. Within the new business logic,  
the importance of networks is increasing. In particular, strategic networks is relevant for 
wealth creation in e-business because of the importance of networks of firms, suppliers, 
customers, and other partners in the virtual market space (Amit and Zott, 2001). 
Venture-backed firms make use of the venture capitalist to a large extent in order to 
complement their own management resources (Landström, 1990). Indeed, according to 
Manigart and Struyf (1997), the main reason for why the ventures in their study applied 
for venture capital was the professional advice and the management support that the VCs 
provide post investment. According to Fried and Hisrich (1995, p.102) the main inputs 
VCs have to offer are: “money, operating services, networks, image, moral support, 
general business knowledge, and discipline”. 
Often, the investors are represented on the board of directors or in direct managerial 
positions within the firm. Both the effort and the usefulness of outside board members are 
regarded as greater in the early stages (seed, start-up, and first-stage financing) than the 
later stages (second-stage financing and later) (Rosenstein et al., 1993). As suggested by 
Boeker (1989), Brittain (1989) and Bamford et al. (1999), early decisions and founding 
conditions, in the formative stages of an organisation, have lasting effects which: imprint 
the firm, limit its strategic choice, and continue to impact its long-term performance.  
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One major reason for this deals with the general path dependence of resource 
development processes. The early stages of a firm’s existence define the development of 
the organisation’s deep structures. Deep structures are defined as  
“the set of fundamental ‘choices’ a system has made of (1) the basic parts into 
which its units will be organised and (2) the basic activity pattern that will 
maintain its existence.” (Gersick, 1991, p.14) 
These deep structures can be identified in organisations as routines and cultures that 
guide managerial decisions, but can also be traced back to the initial strategic choices 
made by the founders (Boeker, 1988). In these initial stages, the entrepreneurs must 
decide on an initial strategy on the basis of the resources at hand and those they can 
realistically acquire (Dollinger, 1999; Sarasvathy, 2001). This initial strategy, which 
determines which resources and capabilities are to be employed and which are to be 
developed and acquired, will in turn, result in a new set of available resources when  
a new strategy is made at the next crossroad. Gersick (1991) illustrates this by means  
of a decision tree. Once one decision is made, the resulting strategic options are reduced. 
Hence, even though a specific set of means can result in different strategic decisions 
(Sarasvathy, 2001), the resource development process is arguably path dependent. 
As a consequence of the shift in business logic, the initial resources needed for new 
venture teams to establish viable businesses, are changing. As the innovation may 
represent a new business model, rather than a new product/service or a new price/value 
relation, the early decisions are of significant importance for new venture teams. Within 
the new business logic, the importance of the resources associated with knowledge  
areas like strategy, marketing and finance, is increasing, while the hitherto focus on 
product-specific knowledge alone is diminishing. That is, the initial decisions are no 
longer limited to technical aspects to produce superior products/services, but rather 
embracing the important business model of the new venture. The contribution by VCs is 
rarely associated with the technical details of the specific innovation (Murray, 1996). 
More commonly VCs contribute with knowledge within strategy, finance as well as 
networks to finance suppliers, customers and strategic partners. The new business logic 
leads to increased relevance of the relationship capital (Sawhney and Zabin, 2002)  
as well as making demands on the strategic insight and market knowledge of the new 
venture team. This means that when the level of innovation shifts from product/service 
towards the business model, the need for VCs’ value adding activity is moving closer to 
the inception of the new venture. Thus, we propose for future research: 
Hypotheses 1: The VCs’ contribution to their portfolio companies has greater impact 
closer to the inception of the new venture. 
According to venture capital research, VCs whom have experience from the focal 
industry of the portfolio company, provide significantly more value than those with less 
focal industry experience (Sapienza et al., 1996). Knowledge of the e-business models is 
of special relevance for the entrepreneurs in the information age. “An e-business model  
is a descriptive representation of the fundamental components of a business that operates 
partially or completely on the internet” (Canzer, 2003). Brokerage e-business models 
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• Advertising e-business Model is based on earning revenue in exchange  
for the display of advertisements on a firm’s web site. 
• Subscription, Pay-per-View and Membership e-business Models earn revenues 
through the use of these methods. 
• Distribution Channel member e-business model include activities of retailers, 
wholesalers, and manufacturers carrying on business through the Internet. 
• Affiliation e-business Model involves payments to web site operators for customers 
who find their way to a company’s site. 
• Community e-business Model built around the idea that a group of online users can 
regularly use the web site for commercial purposes. 
• Infomediary e-business Model is based on the collection and sale of online 
information. Portal e-business Model earns revenues by drawing users to its site  
and serving as gateway to information on the internet (Canzer, 2003, pp.120–126). 
To be able to secure their own investment the role of private equity could be changed 
towards the realities of the information age. Competence to use the new business logic 
together with competence on network, change, human, and process capital in addition to 
financial capital is of importance for the entrepreneur in the information age. This leads 
to our second proposition: 
Hypothesis 2: VCs with significant knowledge, experience and networks within  
e-business will add more value to their portfolio ventures than venture capitalists 
without these resources. 
5 Agency theory and Venture Capitalists’ (VCs) governance effort 
Because of asset specificity and sunk costs associated with production capital in 
entrepreneurial ventures, venture capitalist need to be assured that they will receive  
a return on their investments. To provide this assurance, investors may utilise corporate 
governance mechanisms (Schleifer and Vishny, 1997). According to agency theory 
scholars (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1983), such mechanisms includes 
incentive alignment (e.g., share ownership, stock options, or a threat of dismissal if 
income is low), contractual covenants (e.g., limits on capital expenditures, limits on 
managerial salaries, technology non-disclosure agreements, etc.) and monitoring effort 
(e.g., board representation, financial reports, etc.). 
Research on the venture capitalist/new venture team relationship has to a large extent 
been rooted in agency theory (e.g., Barney et al., 1994, 1996). The agency theoretical 
considerations are especially related to governance mechanisms relevant to contracting 
and controlling issues of the relationship. In essence, agency theory concerns cooperative 
behaviour between parties with differing goals and differing attitudes toward risk 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The underlying assumption for the employment of agency theory is 
that there are incentives present for the agent not always to act in the best interest of the 
principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, agency theory, as outlined by Jensen and 
Meckling, focuses on “the behavioural implications of the property rights specified in the 
contracts between owners and manager of the firm” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.308). 
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Hence, agency theory is concerned with the structuring of control relationships and focus 
on the legal contract between the cooperating partners (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Venture capital research has proposed various mechanisms for VCs to control the 
behaviour of the new venture teams of their portfolio companies. Governance 
mechanisms employed in the relationship between VCs and new venture teams typically 
include contractual provisions, monitoring arrangements, and bonding (Barney et al., 
1996; Busenitz et al., 2004). Such mechanisms include staging the infusion of capital, 
compensation schemes and active involvement in the management of their portfolio 
companies (Sahlman, 1990). 
Due to moral hazard and adverse selection, it may difficult for the venture capitalist 
to observe the behaviour of the portfolio companies. In general, the venture capitalist has 
two options. One is to discover the portfolio firm behaviour by investing in monitoring 
effort (e.g., board representation, reporting procedures, and budgeting systems).  
The other option is to contract on the outcomes of the portfolio venture’s behaviour 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). One issue seen as a determinant of which strategy to pursue relates to 
the task performed by the agent. The argument is that the programmability of the task is 
likely to influence the ease of monitoring behaviour (Eisenhardt, 1989). Hence, it is 
assumed that the more the behaviour by the agent can be specified in advance, the easier 
it is to verify whether the agent has lived up to its obligations. This means that the more 
programmed the task, the more attractive are behaviour-based contracts because 
information about the agent’s behaviour is more readily determined (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Vice versa, when the level of task programmability is low, contracts based on outcomes, 
which seek to coalign the preferences of the agent to those of the principal, are regarded 
to be most effective. According to our arguments, the new business logic implies that an 
increasingly part of entrepreneurship endeavour is taking place at the business model 
level rather than on the product/service level. As may be the case also when it comes to 
the development and market introduction of new product/services, especially high-tech 
innovations, the programmability of a business model innovation will in general be low. 
This means that outcome-based contracts may be more appropriate for VCs to control 
their portfolio companies within the new business logic. Hence we propose: 
Hypothesis 3: When the innovation concerns the business model, outcome-based 
contracts will be more effective than behaviour-based contracts. 
Because entrepreneurs may have incentives to continue running projects they know have 
negative net present value (Gompers, 1995), the staging of venture capital investments 
may allow the VCs to intervene and price subsequent rounds so that they earn a fair rate 
of return. Hence, staging of capital payouts may be an efficient strategy for the VCs due 
to the resolution of uncertainty as the portfolio firms develops (Gompers, 1995). 
However, for entrepreneurial ventures in which the innovation lies on the business model 
level, it may be difficult to link such payouts to stages of the development process as is 
frequently done in the financing of early stage ventures. Further, stage-based financing 
based on milestones regarding product/service development is rooted in causation logic 
of new firm development. As argued by Sarasvathy (2001), the creators of new firms may 
as well follow effectuation strategies. Hence, the staging of venture capital investments 
should be based on milestones that are not product/service specific. This means that 
indicators of growth, market success or economic performance, strategic alliances etc. 
may be more effective within the new business logic. Hence, we propose: 
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Hypothesis 4: The staging of capital payouts based on milestones regarding 
product/service development are less effective than staging based on economic 
indicators when the innovation take place at the business concept level. 
6 The changing role of private equity 
The role of private equity is confronted with these new challenges in the information age. 
The business concepts ought to be developed in the light of the new business logic.  
In this logic, the concept could more easily be based on cooperation between suppliers in 
a value creating star (Normann, 2001). The value creation system could more easily 
satisfy broad customer needs and could operate with low transaction costs.  
The new paradigm could imply new roles both for private equity and the 
entrepreneur. This is illustrated in Table 1. 
Table 1 The roles of private equity and the entrepreneur classified according to focus 
 
The optimal solution would be if both the entrepreneur and the investor were focusing on 
business opportunities and value creation (Aldrich, 1979) and not over focusing on the 
product/service properties (Bamford et al., 1999). 
This would imply a more active role for private equity and give the entrepreneur 
intellectual support when he needs it the most- in the phase of developing the business 
idea. Entrepreneurs seem to lack motivation for active information search in unfamiliar 
domains and when they have a high level of confidence. The link between capital and 
competence could motivate the entrepreneur for business development (Cooper, 1993).  
A more active role for the venture capital would influence the role of public sector 
providers of venture capital (Write et al., 1999). 
This leads to our fifth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: There will be a greater success rate for entrepreneurs when both the 
entrepreneur and the representative for the private equity are focusing on value 
creation than if they both are focusing on product/services. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper we have discussed new challenges for entrepreneurs and their venture 
capital backers. Due to the paradigm shift from an industrial society to an information 
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society, the role of the entrepreneur ought to change from being an inventor of 
product/services to become a value creator. Hence, the focus of entrepreneurial ventures 
should be shifting towards creating viable business models rather than superior 
product/services. This has implications for both entrepreneurs and venture capitalist. 
First, venture capital providers should be more closely involved with a firm’s inception of 
the new ventures in order to be effective as resource providers. Second, knowledge 
regarding e-business models is increasingly important for VCs to enhance value creation 
in their portfolio ventures. To govern their portfolio ventures introducing new business 
models to the market, venture capitalist have to find alternatives to stage-based models 
rooted in product development sequences. Such mechanisms are less effective when it 
comes to governance of new ventures which innovation lies on the business model level. 
Hence, staging of capital payouts should be based on indicators decoupled from the 
product/service development process. Further, outcome based contracts may be more 
effective than behaviour-based contracts when it comes to innovation on the business 
model level. For entrepreneurs, the resource acquisition processes should be more 
focused on attracting relational capital and human capital resources in addition to 
physical capital resources.  
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